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Abstract This paper aims to examine the influence of private corporations in the tripartite structure of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU): Telecommunications Standardization, Radiocommunication, and Telecommunications Development. The paper finds that, in the standardization sector, power has been effectively transferred from nation states to the private corporate sector since the approval process now enables standards to be approved by members of the study group that developed them, which is essentially the private sector. In the radiocommunication sector, the private sector continues to conduct much of the requisite technical work, but national
governments are ultimately the decision makers and, further, it is difficult to distinguish between treaty and nontreaty work. In the development sector, the ITU seeks to create an enabling environment for private investment in
developing countries and actively seeks to build private sector partnerships. In the long run the ITU may be unable
to satisfy either its narrow corporate constituency or the vast majority of its developing country members. As the
United Nations agency which coordinates satellite spacing and allocates access to the electromagnetic spectrum on
an international basis, the ITU is the world's most prominent international telecommunications institution, so its
structural modifications and membership changes are of great significance in a world increasingly dependent on a
global grid of wired and wireless telecommunications networks.

In accord with the expanded embrace of neoliberalism, the reform and privatization of the telecommunications sector, a policy process which
diffused rapidly globally throughout the 1990s,
was accompanied by the restructuring of the
world's most prominent international telecommunications institution, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the United Nations
agency which coordinates satellite spacing and
allocates access to the electromagnetic spectrum
on an international basis. This article examines
the ways in which the private sector has extended
its influence in the three sectors of the ITU,
which correspond to its main areas of activity:
Telecommunication Standardization (ITU-T),
Radiocommunication (ITU-R), and Telecommunications Development (ITU-D). The tripartite
structure is a result of the Additional Plenipotentiary Conference, held in Geneva in 1992, which
streamlined ITU activities after the Plenipotentiary Conference held in Nice in 1989 initiated an
evaluation of ITU structures, operations, and resources and embarked on restructuring the organization to make it more responsive to its members in a market-based, privately controlled global telecommunications environment.
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In conjunction with the structural modification of the ITU, its membership base has witnessed change as the organization actively seeks
to attract more private sector, corporate participants. Although the ITU is still referred to as an
inter-governmental organization, since it comprises almost all of the world's countries which
are designated as members who alone retain full
voting rights, it now encompasses more than 650
private companies from the telecommunication,
broadcasting, and information technology sectors
that are classified as sector members. The 1998
and 2002 Plenipotentiary Conferences focused
on strengthening the participation of the private
sector in the ITU, adopting several resolutions
enhancing the rights of sector members, as well
as measures to enable the ITU to match industry's time-frames and operational practices. Private sector members were also admitted on a
provisional basis as observers at Council 2005
and 2006 sessions. Some contend that such progress in expanding the rights of the private sector
has been meager, given the amount of effort extended over many years to increase their influence, and many segments of the global telecommunications industry, who could provide valuable expertise, still consider participating in the
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ITU to be irrelevant and unnecessary for expanding their operations as this can be attained
through bilateral negotiations. Others, however,
aver that in light of the increased private sector
participation in ITU activities it is essential that
the needs of developing countries remain at the
forefront of the ITU agenda and do not succumb
to corporate directives.
Developing countries constitute the majority
of ITU members and the bulk of the world's populace to whom telecommunications services must
be extended in order to reduce the global disparity in access to information technologies and services. As noted, the ITU enjoys near universal
membership, but that does not equate to universal participation. Full participation in ITU fora
presents a variety of complex impediments for
many developing counties who lack sufficient
knowledgeable and experienced staff to articulate
and successfully lobby, if you will, for their
needs and for the attainment of equitable management and development of "common heritage"
principles as related to space (Vogler, 1995).
This article thus seeks to assess the various views
regarding private sector participation in the ITU
as well as the ramifications of the private participants on the activities of the ITU's three divisions.
METHODOLOGIES
The work of international institutions is one of
the most influential factors governing our world,
with decisions generally made by representatives
of ruling groups, thus its endeavors are biased in
relation to those in power (Escobar, 1995). As
Escobar (1995) writes, our knowledge is ideological in the sense that the international organization's conceptions and means of description represent the world as it is for those who rule it, rather than for those who are ruled. The relationship between the two is socially constructed by
bureaucratic and textual mechanisms that are anterior to their interaction, though the interaction
is presented as "facts", which can be categorized
by professional discourse and presented in standardized ways (Escobar, 1995). Ethnomethodologists contend that institutional texts cannot be
taken as objective records of external reality, but
3!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2007!

must be understood in relation to institutional
uses and goals and in the context of their production and interpretation (Escobar, 1995). Institutional ethnography thus attempts to discern the
ways in which institutional procedures shape or
produce socioeconomic and sociocultural practices.
Since this research is interdisciplinary in nature with several contemporary, interrelated issues being examined, methodologically, this
work attempts to employ institutional ethnography in conjunction with the case study, which
draws upon multiple data sources to investigate a
specific phenomenon. Multiple sources of evidence are the primary strength of case studies
since they facilitate the development of converging lines of inquiry, a process of triangulation.
This study, which employs economic, political,
and communication concepts and theories, is
based on three sources of evidence: documentation, archival records, and élite interviews. In
gathering data, field research was conducted at
the ITU in Geneva in the spring of 2005. Case
studies are not generalizable to populations or
universes, but to theoretical propositions, thus
the goal of the research is to generate analytic
generalizations regarding telecommunications
reform and the restructuring of international regimes.
REGIME ANALYSIS
The ITU is an international regime concerned
with space and spectrum, part of our global
commons, like seas, watercourses, and the atmosphere. The military and commercial utilization of space does not, however, generate widespread pubic interest or extensive involvement of
non-governmental organizations as do other environmental issues. Radio frequencies or satellite
orbital slots cannot be depleted as can fish stocks
or minerals, but they are a relatively scarce and
inordinately valuable resource that engenders
competition for the best slots and specific frequencies. Furthermore, the use of one particular
transmitter can impinge on another, thus this interdependency requires international coordination in order to avoid damaging interference
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(Vogler, 1995). The ITU, virtually since its inception in 1865 to regulate international telegraphy networks, has been concerned with ensuring
the orderly use of the electronic commons as its
mandate has gradually expanded with the advent
of each new technology, from voice telephony to
communications satellites to the technological
convergence that defines the present digital, telecommunications-based information era. The ITU
can thus be defined as a common property resource regime.
A regime is traditionally defined as a form of
governance which comprises a set of norms,
principles, rules and decision-making procedures
that govern a particular issue area, such as the
use of the global commons (Vogler, 1995).
While this work does not intend to delve into the
theories of international regimes, it is nonetheless
necessary to differentiate meritorious, but contrasting points of view. Neoliberals contend that
interdependencies and mutual interests conspire
to promote increased international cooperation.
Certainly establishing a common property status
for international space and airspace and creating
international technical standards reduces the
transaction costs of conducting commerce. This
congruence of interest does not, however, devalue the validity of neorealist contentions that mutual interests are not sufficient for regime development. Neorealist proponents contend that the
presence of a dominant state or group of states
which has the power to impose acceptance of the
regime and compliance on other states is essential, because the hegemonic state or grouping
will only support an international regime if it acquires greater relative gains (Zacher and Sutton,
1996).
Indeed, when the USA joined the ITU in
1932, it was able to extract a number of concessions to its interests in exchange for joining because many ITU members sought to include the
American market in the multilateral fold (Drake,
2000). The USA as well as Canada had not earlier joined the predecessor to the ITU, the International Telegraph Union, since it had not wanted
to nationalize or impose treaty obligations and
rates on its private carriers. Although private carriers were allowed to participate in the adminis4!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2007!

trative conferences, albeit without voting rights,
since 1871, these intercontinental undersea cable
companies were essentially forced to acquiesce
to the national Post, Telephone, and Telegraph
(PTT) authorities to secure operating rights. To
facilitate the participation of countries with private carriers, the USA, in agreeing to join the
ITU, required that the decision-making procedures be amended, and the designation of "recognized private operating entity" (RPOA) was
thus developed (Drake, 2000).
The rights of private companies as sector
members in the ITU have since gradually
evolved, in accord with the domestic policies of
the USA and other dominant states. Writes Lyall
(1989), "the law of England as applied to maritime matters through the Admiralty Court had
significant impact and became for most purposes
international maritime law ... History, therefore,
leads me to suspect that US Law may become
international space law ... By reason of its technical skills, its domestic market and its entrepreneurial attitudes, the USA is a major leader in
space matters. That 'lead' may result in much US
law becoming the language in which problems
are discussed and solved." Policy differences between the USA, England, and Japan withstanding,
each state liberalized basic and non-basic services, allowed the interconnection of leased lines
as well as the reselling of capacity on leased lines,
and permitted private firms in international cable
and satellite markets, and in lieu of such changes
and pressure from these hegemonic powers, the
ITU officially retracted its restrictions against the
reselling of leased lines in the early 1990s, which
in turn enabled the development of competition
in the traditional PTT market structures (Zacher
and Sutton, 1996).
Liberalization of telecommunications as a
domestic policy also led, at the international level, to the introduction of trade in services into the
General Agreement for Tariff and Trade (GATT)
Uruguay Round 1986-1994. The series of accords that were approved in April 1994 included
a General Agreement in Trade in Services
(GATS) and a Telecommunications Annex. Adherents to these GATT Agreements went on to
establish within the institutional body of the
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World Trade Organization (WTO), which effectively succeeded GATT, an Agreement on Basic
Telecommunications and a Reference Paper,
which placed national regulations in the multilateral arena for the first time. These institutional
changes support Cowhey's (1990) contentions
that domestic politics are the primary source of
regime change as hegemonic players influence
the change of institutional structures, affect the
centralization of power in a regime, and alter the
jurisdiction of the regime vis-à-vis that of an individual state.
Vogler (1995), however, states that the existence of a hegemonic leader is not the distinguishing characteristic of an effective regime, but the
perception of high levels of mutual vulnerability
independence. In this regard, it is not considered
viable for the USA, for example, to leave the
ITU, as it had UNESCO, due to economic dependence on the vital, global telecommunications
infrastructure. Cognizance of this position may
lead to compromise, however, equally arguable
is that it portends for hegemonic states, notably
the USA, to strive for greater influence over other regime members. The interests and activities
of states and corporations are often indistinguishable, and Cox (1987) views the senior officials of such institutions as forming a transnational managerial class who have created a globally hegemonic business culture whose interests
transcend the state-market dichotomy and are
well represented at the ITU, as evident in the US
delegation.
UNITED STATES ITU ASSOCIATION
Although US delegates to the ITU represent US
policy, not any particular company or private interest, the fact that all delegates are charged with
supporting the documentation that is submitted
by the USA is to a large extent immaterial given
the crucial role of the private sector in initially
formulating the policy. The United States ITU
Association (USITUA) was formed in December
of 1999 as an open US industry forum for discussion of issues and development of consensus on
proposals and views on ITU policy matters that
maximize common benefits to the US industry.
5!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2007!

The trade association seeks to provide the private
sector with a greater voice as it works toward
improving ITU processes and improving the US
preparatory processes. Fundamentally, the
USITUA seeks to develop greater coordination
and cooperation between the private sector and
the US Government to enhance US effectiveness
in the ITU. The views of USITUA are solicited
on various issues by the US Department of State,
the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), and the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), since it is
recognized as a vital participant in activities of
the US Government that affects private sector
interests in ITU-related matters (Rappoport,
2003).
It is important to note in this regard that private corporations in the USA are legally regarded
as persons and entitled to the legal rights and
protections the Constitution affords to an individual person in accord with the 1886 Supreme
Court ruling in the case of Santa Clara County v.
Southern Pacific Railroad Company . Corporate
influence in molding the policies of the FCC as
well as Congressional legislation, such as the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which enabled
ever more mergers in the US communications
industry, cannot be underestimated. Policies are
largely formed in the USA without public participation or public discourse. This model is in essence that which is pursued in the ITU, which
supports the contentions of neorealists regarding
the influence of hegemonic states, for, ironically,
the ITU, while committed to freedom on information, classifies its information and thus prohibits public access and input. Information regarding ongoing work and meetings in the ITU is
not publicly available - only to its members. The
ITU may well be advised to adopt a Freedom of
Information Act to declassify documents before
the requisite 20 years. The rhetoric of the ITU
withstanding, it can claim no direct accountability to citizens, though it is committed to the inclusion of the corporate class. According to Lee
(1996), the vast majority of private sector delegates to the Plenipotentiary Conference, the supreme organ of the ITU, come from the core
countries that dominate the global telecommuni-
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cations market, namely, the USA, the UK, Japan,
Canada, France and Italy, and, given the decentralized structure of conference proceedings, the
influence of these delegates far exceed their actual numbers.
TRIPARTITE STRUCTURE OVERVIEW
Indeed, 12 of the 28-member panel assigned
to formulate recommendations for institutional
reform came from leading private sector telecommunications and business organizations
(Geri, 2001). Taverns (2000) writes that the panel members urged that the ITU be transformed
into a private-public partnership, arguably essential as its PTT political authority has eroded and
greater telecommunications deliberations now
occur in the liberalization-oriented World Trade
Organization. The panel also suggested that the
authority and responsibility of the General Secretariat be enhanced and the operations divided
among the three functional arms be combined,
though this would remove the discretionary power accorded each Sector to ascertain its own institutional responses to its needs and constituents
(Taverns, 2000). Although this recommendation
was not adopted, it is clear that the architects of
the tripartite structure of the ITU lacked the foresight to appreciate the competition and rivalry
between the Sectors that would ensue. Parkes
(2000) contends that bitter in-fighting deprived
ITU Secretary General Utsumi of the senior support he needed. Indeed, each of the individual
sector directors vies for the position of Secretary
General as their terms expire simultaneously.
Such issues of stability and change have long
been of concern to regime theorists, and it should
be noted that the creation of the tripartite structure and the change of rules and decision-making
procedures within each of the Sectors of the ITU
signify the adaptive process of the regime, not
actual regime change which would entail an alteration of norms and principles (Vogler, 1995).
Reform did not include an alteration of the
achievement of consensus, nor the creation of
centralized mechanisms to monitor compliance
with its instruments. The purposes of the ITU
have remained essentially unaltered. There has,
6!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2007!

however, been a subtle, but fundamental shift of
power from nation states, irrespective of their
voting status in the Union, to transnational corporations. This is in accord with what Geri (2001)
refers to as the New Public Management, in
which the state, devoted to securing conditions
that enable the domination of multinational firms,
engages in administrative reforms which include
privatization of state owned enterprises, deregulation, competition in services, and facilitation of
the role of the private sector in international organizations. Geri (2001) contends that of all the
UN specialized agencies, the ITU is under the
most pressure, due to incessant changes in the
telecommunications sector and the fear of becoming irrelevant in light of these changes, to
implement substantial reforms strengthening the
role of non-state stakeholders.
BUDGET
Although Geri (2001) states that funding issues
do not appear to be the driving force for the reforms, the ITU has suffered notable financial duress in recent years. Sector members have certainly assisted in alleviating the ITU's budgetary
woes, which accounts in part for the organization's campaign to recruit private companies to
become active members and fund its various
programs. It need be noted, though, that threatening to reduce one's financial contribution is often
employed as a means to change an organization,
or at least as a limited retaliation or demonstrated
opposition to an organizational decision, as arguably demonstrated by some European firms reducing their ITU contributions when voting
rights were denied to sector members.
According to the ITU (2006a), sector members contribute 11.6 percent and associate members, a more limited class of private company
participants, contribute 0.6 percent of the overall
budget. Notably, other forms of private sector
financial contributions account for a further 15.2
percent of total funding, namely, cost recovery
for services such as project execution, satellite
notifications, and the sale of publications, thus
raising total private sector contributions to more
than 27 percent of the ITU budget. It should also
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be noted that as a group sector members and associates pay about as much that paid in total by
approximately 88 percent of the member states,
and that if a sector member joins all three sectors,
that sector member pays nearly the amount that
60 percent of the member states pay. This situation is attributed to the lower amounts paid by
developing countries.
At each Plenipotentiary Conference, each
member and sector member freely selects its
class of contribution, from one-sixteenth of a unit
to 40 units. When the budget is approved, the
amount of the contributory unit is determined,
which for the biennium 2006-2007 is set at Swiss
Francs or CHF 318,000 per unit. The current
value of one contributory unit for a sector member is set at one-fifth of that of a member. Only
members listed by the UN as least developed
countries and approved by Council may select
the one-eighth and one-sixteenth unit classes of
contribution. Although the contributory unit for
associates has been fixed at CHF 10,600 for the
ITU Radiocommunication and Telecommunication Standardization Sectors, the Development
Sector is only CHF 3,975 and merely CHF
1,987.50 for associates from developing countries ([10] ITU, 2006a).
MacLean (2003a) recommends that this freechoice financing scheme of the ITU be replaced
in order to secure and solidify its financial position. Furrer (2000) concurs, stating that the ITU's
fragile financial position can be strengthened by
widening the financial base, lowering the contributory unit to make the ITU affordable to a
wider range of actors, and if necessary, forging
guidelines on the appropriate level of contributions to prevent sector members from reducing
their contribution to the strictest minimum. Since
member states cannot be restored to their former
position at the center of global governance,
MacLean (2003a) contends, reform must entail
acceptance of plural centers of power, a new coalition of stakeholders with equal rights and obligations. Furrer (2000) argues that sector members should be given more decisional power, including voting rights, at all levels of ITU activities, particularly regarding finances and budgets.
In exchange for being on an equal footing with
7!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2007!

member states within the Finance Committee,
sector members, writes Furrer (2000), should
contribute to the ITU's budget on a basis proportionate to their activities and be allowed to allocate financial resources to a specific activity
within a sector. Furrer (2000) also proposes that
voting procedures should be introduced and applied when consensus cannot be reached.
Enhancing the decision-making rights and financial responsibilities of the private sector in
the ITU has been staunchly advocated by Europe,
but there is a sharp divergence of opinion regarding the apposite role for the private sector among
the different member states. Many members, particularly developing countries, object to the increased involvement and influence of private
sector interests in ITU decision-making processes, though they may be amenable if it correlates
to greater financial contributions (MacLean,
2003a). The Arab states, however, have submitted proposals in the ITU-R to clearly delineate
treaty and non-treaty matters, and to the extent
possible, exclude the participation of the sector
members from the treaty-making processes
(Fisher, 2003), which is in sharp contrast to what
has transpired in the ITU-T where power has
been effectively transferred from governments to
the private sector (Fisher, 2003). Financial pressures have prompted each of the sectors to reassess its working methods and structures to be increasingly efficient, and demarcate the appropriate role for the private sector, which varies significantly between the three sectors.
ITU-T
In the ITU-T, formerly the International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee
(CCITT), sector members have come to play an
equal role with governments in determining the
agenda for each four-year standardization cycle.
Study groups of experts from the private sector,
that is, the leading international telecommunication organizations, then conduct the technical
work of developing standards and specifications
for telecommunications systems, networks and
services. Arguably in no other international industry are technical interconnection standards of
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more importance than in telecommunications
(Zacher and Sutton, 1996). Until 1989 telecommunications equipment standards were approved
only every four years as recommendations by the
plenary assemblies of the former CCITT and the
CCIR (International Radio Consultative Committee), which was an extremely long time frame
given the rapid pace of change in this arena. The
exponential growth and convergence of communications technology coupled with competition in
standards setting by regional bodies and private
sector software developers have served, in part,
as the impetus for reform of ITU-T (Vogler,
1995), which, until 2001, required that all standards be approved by member states before they
became official, even though most standards
were developed in study groups comprised of the
private sector (MacLean, 2003a).
To help ensure that the ITU's preeminent role
in this realm was not usurped, the Alternative
Approval Process (AAP) was then adopted,
which enables standards to be approved by the
members of the study group that developed them,
which is in essence the private sector. Adoption
of the AAP has reduced the average time-tomarket of ITU-T's recommendations by six
months, for the traditional approval process averaged about 36.2 weeks, while the AAP is concluded in about 9.4 weeks (Fishman, 2003).
Some, however, contend that this process is insufficient to curb the ascendance of a diverse
range of private sector-led standard bodies and
the ITU may become a mere rubber stamp for the
outcomes of deliberations within the Global
Standards Cooperation Group (Zacher and Sutton,
1996). Regardless of the ITU's ability to retain its
historical dominance in the standardization process, it must be noted that the AAP, which is
now employed in virtually all Standardization
Sector study groups, has enabled the ITU-T to
effectively evade the sovereignty principle,
which, MacLean (2003a) contends, is no longer
germane in the current global governance environment, and since it is from this principle that
the ITU institutional framework stems, it is in the
very framework of the ITU, its legal foundations,
organizational structures and formal decision8!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2007!

making procedures, that the fundamental problems facing the organization lie.
Indeed many consider the reforms instituted
in 1992 inadequate, and, in regard to ITU-T,
there are proposals, many of which originate in
Europe, to further increase the role of the private
sector by creating a separate forum, primarily
governed and financed by private sector members, for the development of technical standards
not involving policy regulatory matters (Fisher,
2003). Separating technical and regulatory functions has long been a source of debate, though,
and arguably all decisions have some public policy implications, so drawing the line between
those issues in which the industry should have a
major voice and those left to the regulators is a
constant source of contention, especially as relates to the ITU-R.
ITU-R
The USA does not support proposals to split the
ITU-T or the ITU-R into separate bodies, as it is
satisfied with current procedures, and asserts that
the tripartite structure is sound. Although the
USA has consistently opposed a broad restructuring of the ITU in a way which would equate to
member states sharing power on a equal level
with the private sector, it does seek to retain extensive private sector participation in conducting
the vital research concerning the technical characteristics and operational procedures for terrestrial and space-based wireless services and systems that serves as a basis for the regulatory decisions made at the ITU-R's World Radiocommunication Conferences (WRCs). The work of
the R-Sector, that is developing the technical
recommendations and treaty instruments governing the allocation and use of the radio frequency
spectrum and related orbital resources, is of serious consequence to member states and sector
members alike, though member states are the final decision-makers at WRCs, which are now
held every three years.
The complex negotiations overseen by the RSector regarding the radio frequency spectrum
form legally binding agreements embedded in
the Radio Regulations. It is in part for this reason
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that the R-Sector has not adopted the Alternative
Approval Process of the ITU-T, since technical
recommendations may acquire regulatory status
by being incorporated into the Radio Regulations
and most ITU-R questions and recommendations
are considered to be of an intrinsic policy or regulatory nature (United States Department of State,
2003)). In this same vein, the USA does not support proposals to distinguish between the RSector's treaty and non-treaty work. Indeed, it
contends such a distinction is not feasible since
key technical and operational elements of treaty
instruments cannot be developed, evaluated, and
decided on independently of the non-treaty technical underpinnings of the subject matter
(USITUA, 2005). Thus, sector members, who
play a pivotal role in coordinating the work of
the R-Sector with their member states, cannot be
excluded from the treaty making processes. The
influence of the private sector in defining its respective member state's policies and proposals as
part of the preparatory work for a successful
WRC varies significantly, and is notably weaker
among developing countries, but it is nonetheless
of vital importance to have an efficient national
as well as regional consultation between the private sector and the government.
The approval of ITU-R recommendations essentially comprises two stages, with the adoption
of a text developed in a working party or task
group, and then submitted to the member states
for final approval. In some cases, due to logistics
and expenses associated with traveling, draft recommendations prepared by the working parties
cannot be made available in the working languages in time for the study group, so to expedite
the process a single language draft may be employed, though this may conceivably exclude
some countries from participating. The document
is then forwarded at the adoption stage by correspondence when texts in the working languages
are available. To hasten the process, a new procedure was developed in 2003 whereby the adoption by the study group and the approval by
member states are undertaken concurrently by
correspondence using electronic means of communications (USITUA, 2005). This process,
while efficient, can prove problematic for devel9!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2007!

oping countries who cannot often participate in
the exchange of draft documents since they have
inconsistent access to the internet.
ITU-D
To administer development assistance activities
and redress the global imbalance of telecommunications services, the Telecommunications Development Bureau (BDT) was created in 1989.
The Bureau is financed by the ITU's regular
budget, a change long resisted, writes Lee (1996),
by those members who contribute substantially
to the budget. Indeed, Fisher (2003) notes that
there is concern among Member states as to
whether they are receiving full value for the services rendered by the D Sector and the funds allocated to the D Sector, which are approximately
the same amount as allocated to the R-Sector.
Some question the appropriateness of development activities being in the ITU and suggest that
other international treaty organizations undertake
the work. A further consideration is MacLean's
(2003a) contention that developing countries
have not made noteworthy gains in the ITU reform process and their role in the standardization
and radiocommunication sectors has not increased significantly as a result of the creation of
the D Sector. The D Sector was established at the
same time as the ITU embarked on enlarging the
rights and obligations of private sector members
of the ITU, which is indicative of its adherence
to market-led development.
The ITU-D fully embraces neoliberal ideology as it strives to broker partnerships with the
private sector with a view to harnessing the
commercial drive of the telecommunications industry to address the needs of developing countries (ITU, 2006b). Within the ITU-D, member
states, writes Fisher (2003), actively solicit the
support of the private sector as they recognize
the need for technical expertise, financial support,
and educational and training programs, which is
not forthcoming from governmental sources. As
traditional sources of international development
assistance grow increasingly scarce, the ITU-D
deems it essential that the private industry play a
catalytic role in promoting strategic partnerships
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with developing countries. The ITU's role has
shifted from providing technical assistance to
advising on a wide range of issues relating to telecommunications sector reform aimed at creating
an enabling environment for private investment.
While this goal assists capitalism's expansion and
may claim indirect benefits for citizens of developing countries, it should not be confused with
development.
Development emphasizes the orientation of
production towards basic needs, the orientation
of distribution of goods and services towards the
poor majority, the incorporation of a social dimension into technological research and innovation, and popular participation in a democratic
system. The goal of development, that is, the improvement of society through strong economic
growth, accompanied by full employment and
income distribution favoring the popular classes,
has not been clearly identified as part of the ITUD agenda. Rather, the ITU's promotion of universal approaches to telecommunications policies in
conjunction with advocating global principles
contradicts sustainable, self-reliant development
which focuses on local participation in defining
and solving community problems, building on
the strengths of the society that undertakes it.
Development of the periphery is not a goal of
capital's strategies, but the ITU situates the telecommunications policies it advocates within a
privatized commercial structure, as it likens modernity with the private sector in accord with the
dominant paradigm of development.
This view of telecommunications and development as a win-win situation for developing
countries and telecommunications service providers alike is espoused by Toure, the former Director of the Development Bureau who was
elected as Secretary-General at the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference in November 2006. Toure
(2003) writes that "[d]eveloping countries will
enjoy increased connectivity and thus improved
access to basic as well as enhanced telecommunications services and applications, while US
firms will gain market share and earn a reasonable return on investment". He also notes that
"[t]he FCC's contribution is most valued by us in
the ITU because their leadership has, in part, en10!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2007!

couraged the rapid growth of regulatory authorities" (Toure, 2003). Many telecommunications
functions have been assumed by the private sector with governments increasingly limiting themselves to a regulatory and supervisory role, however, for the FCC to serve as a model of an independent regulatory authority for developing
countries to emulate is to promote complete
transnational corporate control of the sector
globally, for the FCC effectively operates outside
the light of public attention in the USA and gives
but lip service to the "public interest," for otherwise the FCC could not tolerate corporate concentration in the eminent broadcasting and telecommunications industries. US communications
policies have shifted dramatically from the country's early years of independence when federal
subsidies were allocated to newspapers to ensure
a diversity of perspectives, to the domination of a
few very large, vertically and horizontally integrated transnational corporations. As McChesney
(2004) contends, this cartel structure of the media in the USA coupled with the profitmaximizing commercial orientation of the communications corporations has depoliticized the
American public as it utterly undermines the
press's role as the fourth estate, and the captured
agency of the FCC is impotent to change this, as
are most "independent" regulatory agencies in
developing countries.
The Regulatory Reform Unit of ITU-D organizes meetings, workshops and training programs for national regulators in developing countries, venues at which the private sector can advance its influence. For one day of the annual
Global Symposium for Regulators (GSR), private corporations or sector members are invited
to demonstrate new technological innovations
and educate regulators in the applications of the
emerging technologies. Such education is not a
mere presentation of facts, devoid of regulatory
context, but arguably spun to meet the market
aims of the given manufacturer or service provider. Two days of the GSR are reserved for regulators and policy-makers, but corporate sector
members can sponsor coffee breaks, cocktails
hours, etc. and thereby extend their influence in
these informal gatherings.
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Before these global meetings, regional preparatory meetings are held which are now derived in part from regional working parties
(RWP), which were launched in 2004 and are
open to all private companies in the information
and communications sectors in a given region,
not just ITU sector members. Although only ITU
sector members can chair the meetings, it does
give the opportunity for other private companies
to participate in voicing their concerns and priorities for a given region. The stated objectives,
for example, of the 2nd Arab regional working
party meetings in 2005 were "[t]o elaborate, discuss and consolidate proposals ... [which] should
identify concrete BDT programs and activities to
be submitted to WTDC-06 (Doha), for inclusion
in the next four-year Action Plan. To discuss and
elaborate proposals by ARWP to improve and
develop participation of Sector members and the
private sector in BDT activities and ICT development projects" (Toure, 2005).
CONCLUSIONS
The ITU actively solicits and supports the ascendance of private corporate actors within each
of the three sectors of the organization. In the
Standardization Sector, power has been effectively transferred from nation states to the private
corporate sector since the approval process now
enables standards to be approved by members of
the study group that developed them, which is
essentially the private sector. In the Radiocommunication Sector, where it is difficult to distinguish between treaty and non-treaty work, the
private sector continues to conduct much of the
requisite technical work, though national governments remain the final arbitrators. In the Development Sector, the ITU seeks to create an enabling environment for private investment in developing countries as it actively seeks to build
private sector partnerships. In essence, its orientation to development is aimed at enhancing corporate opportunities for capital accumulation in
developing countries, which, arguably, is neglect
of its responsibilities to the global commons. The
widely held view of the ITU as a value-neutral,
essentially technical UN specialized agency is
11!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2007!

untenable as its objectives conflict. Over the long
term, the ITU may prove unable to satisfy either
its narrow corporate constituency or the vast majority of their developing country Members (Geri,
2001). 'Reform' will thus continue to be the ITU
mantra.
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FOOTNOTES
1. An article submitted to the Editors-in-Chief of
Information Technologies and International Development. A version of it was subsequently
published as "The quest for inclusive governance
of global ICTs: lessons from the ITU in the limits
of national sovereignty, information technologies
and international development" (MacLean,
2003b).
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